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Our understanding of how form, orientation and size are processed within and outside
of awareness is limited and requires further investigation. Therefore, we investigated
whether or not the visual discrimination of basic object features can be influenced by
subliminal processing of stimuli presented beforehand. Visual masking was used to
render stimuli perceptually invisible. Three experiments examined if visible and invisible
primes could facilitate the subsequent feature discrimination of visible targets. The
experiments differed in the kind of perceptual discrimination that participants had to
make. Namely, participants were asked to discriminate visual stimuli on the basis of
their form, orientation, or size. In all three experiments, we demonstrated reliable priming
effects when the primes were visible but not when the primes were made invisible. Our
findings underscore the importance of conscious awareness in facilitating the perceptual
discrimination of basic object features.
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INTRODUCTION
Many studies have demonstrated that the processing of visually presented faces (Kouider et al.,
2009; Faivre et al., 2012), words (De Houwer et al., 2002; Klauer et al., 2007; Ortells et al., 2016)
and numbers (Dehaene et al., 1998; Naccache and Dehaene, 2001) can occur outside of awareness.
Less research has considered how more basic features of objects might be processed outside
of awareness. Thus, we aimed to determine if different types of basic stimulus features can be
processed outside of awareness. More specifically, we used a priming paradigm to determine if
the subconscious processing of stimulus form, orientation and size could alter the subsequent
conscious perception of another stimulus.
The ventral pathway is essential for the perceptual recognition of objects (Goodale and
Milner, 1992, 2013). Early visual areas are known to be important in processing basic low-level
stimulus features while later ones are more concerned with more complex features (Tanaka, 1993).
Electrophysiological studies in nonhuman primates and functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) studies in humans have demonstrated that the primary visual cortex (V1) can process
information about the size and orientation of stimuli (for a review see Grill-Spector et al., 2001).
As information is processed further along the ventral stream, neurons have larger receptive fields
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and show preferential activation for more complex stimuli
(Brincat and Connor, 2004; Yau et al., 2013). How these visual
areas interact and how these interactions are implicated in the
conscious perception of stimuli is not fully understood. Some
propose that conscious perception occurs mostly in a bottom-up,
feedforwardmanner (Marr, 1982; Riesenhuber and Poggio, 2000)
while others highlight the importance of top-down modulation
(Rao and Ballard, 1999; Bar, 2003). Regardless of the nature
of these interactions, the question remains as to whether or
not initial forms of processing carried out before conscious
awareness can ultimately influence perceptual recognition.
Contemporary models of consciousness attempt to
explain the differences in neural activation when stimuli are
perceptually visible compared to when they are not—allowing
conscious and subconscious processes to be disentangled
with increasing precision. For instance, Recurrence Theory
(Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000) proposes that perceptually
invisible stimuli reflect a feedforward response that fails
to trigger the necessary recurrent processing needed for
stimuli to become visible. In contrast, the Global Neuronal
Workspace Theory (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011) proposes
that perceptually invisible stimuli reflect a signal that is too
weak to be globally broadcasted elsewhere in the brain. Within
the latter framework, Dehaene et al. (2006) and Dehaene
and Changeux (2011) differentiated between subliminal and
preconscious processing. Namely, subliminal processing, where
the bottom-up processing of a stimulus is insufficient to reach
the threshold for conscious perception, and preconscious
processing, where a stimulus is potentially visible but is not
perceived due to distraction or inattention (Dehaene and
Changeux, 2011). In either case, both have the potential
to influence higher level operations (Koch and Tsuchiya,
2006).
Behavioral research has sought to examine these subconscious
traces using visual masking (e.g., Breitmeyer, 2015). This method
consists of presenting a stimulus to participants rapidly before
and/or after a mask consisting of visual noise (Enns and Di Lollo,
2000). The masks are thought to interfere with the bottom-up
strength of an incoming stimulus, which prevents further analysis
of this signal from reaching conscious awareness. For this
reason, masking is used as an experimental method to present
stimuli subconsciously in a subliminal state. Visual masking
is sometimes combined with a priming paradigm to infer the
degree of processing depth of the masked stimulus (Kouider
and Dehaene, 2007; Yang et al., 2014). Traditional priming
paradigms (without visual masking) consist of presenting a
target stimulus preceded by the presentation of an earlier
stimulus called the prime. The target is processed faster
when the prime and target share some common perceptual
or semantic feature (Tulving and Schacter, 1990). Following
this logic, one can infer that a masked prime was processed
outside of awareness if it exerts an influence on the target.
Indeed, presenting a masked prime that is either perceptually
or semantically congruent with a target is frequently used as
a litmus test for determining subtle subconscious influences in
perceptual and semantic decision-making (e.g., Ortells et al.,
2016).
It is quite evident from a number of studies that invisible
primes can facilitate the perceptual recognition and classification
of visible holistic images into different semantic categories
(e.g., Dell’Acqua and Grainger, 1999; Almeida et al., 2008; Eddy
and Holcomb, 2009; Van den Bussche et al., 2009; Sakuraba
et al., 2012; Hesselmann et al., 2016). However, the question
remains as to whether or not information about the basic form,
orientation and size of objects can also be processed outside of
awareness for the purposes of facilitating perceptual recognition
for those features as opposed to their holistic properties. There is
preliminary evidence that it can.
In a recent study, Jimenez et al. (2017) had participants
classify visible targets as being either a square or a diamond
following the presentation of perceptually invisible primes that
consisted of either the same or the alternative shape. The authors
found that subliminal priming effects were indeed observed.
Likewise, Hesselmann et al. (2016) demonstrated that a prime’s
shape as opposed to its semantic category per se was the principal
driver facilitating the classification of animal and tool stimuli as
being either elongated or non-elongated. In terms of orientation,
several studies demonstrate that the orientation of invisible
primes can affect the subsequent perceptual discrimination of
a visible target’s orientation (Soto et al., 2011; Montoro et al.,
2014; Peremen and Lamy, 2014; King et al., 2016). In terms of
size, our earlier work demonstrates opposite findings (Laycock
et al., 2017). Namely, the size of invisible primes had no
effect on the subsequent perceptual discrimination of a visible
target’s size—at least when continuous flash suppression (CFS)
was used to render the primes perceptually invisible. It is
unknown whether or not visual masking would yield similar
results.
As far as we know, the systematic examination of shape,
orientation and size has not been examined and compared in
one study. Therefore, we aimed to determine if the subconscious
processing of basic stimulus features, such as form, orientation
and size, could still change the subsequent conscious perception
of another stimulus. It was hypothesized that priming would
be observed in both the perceptually visible and invisible
viewing conditions for each of the three features. If these
predictions hold then this would suggest that the perceptual
discrimination of these features does not necessitate awareness
nor the recurrent feedback mechanisms implicated in conscious
awareness discussed earlier (Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000;
Dehaene et al., 2006; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Overview
Participants completed a single testing session that took
approximately 1 h and 30 min to complete. The session began
with tests of handedness (Oldfield, 1971) and visual acuity
(Snellen, 1862). Participants then completed the form, orientation
and size experiments in a counterbalanced order as determined
by a Latin square. Each experiment consisted of four separate
tasks. Participants first completed the threshold task, which
established the maximum luminance contrast at which stimuli
could be suppressed reliably under visual masking. This was
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followed by the first recognition task, which was used to verify
the lack of perceptual visibility of the masked stimuli. Then,
participants completed the priming task, which tested whether
or not there was any processing advantage (i.e., improved
reaction time) when responding to feature-congruent as opposed
to feature-incongruent prime-target combinations, during both
visible and perceptually invisible conditions. Each experiment
ended with the second recognition task, which was implemented
as a way to verify that there were no changes in the visibility of
the masked stimuli.
Participants
We tested 38 participants (16 males, Mage = 22.39 years,
age range: 18–31). Both the size and shape experiments had
34 participants. In the orientation experiment, suppression could
not be achieved in four participants. Therefore, these individuals
were replaced by four participants so that all three experiments
would be matched in sample size. Participants had to be in good
health, right-handed and have normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Preference using the right hand was confirmed using
a modified version of the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory
(Oldfield, 1971) and visual acuity was confirmed using the
Snellen chart (Snellen, 1862). Acuity was 20/40 or better in each
eye for all participants. Participants provided informed written
consent prior to participation and were compensated with a
gift card for their time and any inconveniences. This study was
approved by the La Trobe University Human Ethics Committee
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli and Apparatus
As shown in Figures 1A–C, the stimuli consisted of two exemplar
images for each experiment. They were presented on a gray
background of 40.3 c/m2, which corresponded to the mean
luminance of the entire display. For the form experiment,
radial frequency patterns subtending a visual angle of 6.5◦ were
used (Wilkinson et al., 1998; Figure 1A). They were created
using in-house programs in Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA,
USA). The first stimulus had a radial modulation amplitude
of 0.25, a radial frequency of 5, and an angular phase of 0◦
while the second stimulus had a radial modulation amplitude
of 0.25, a radial frequency of 3, and an angular phase of 0◦.
For the orientation experiment, circular Gabor patches were
created using the ‘‘online Gabor-patch generator’’ (Mathôt, 2017)
and subtended a visual angle of 6.5◦, with a spatial frequency
of 2.8 cycles per degree. The first Gabor patch was oriented
315◦ while the second one was oriented 45◦ (Figure 1B). For
the size experiment, the stimuli were created using the same
in-house programs as those to generate the stimuli for the form
experiment. Stimuli in the size experiment were circles of two
different sizes with a radial frequency of 0. The larger circle
subtended a visual angle of 9◦ while the smaller circle subtended
a visual angle of 4◦ (Figure 1C). The stimuli were presented on a
24-inch LCD Dell monitor at a resolution of 1920 × 1200 and
a viewing distance of 57 cm. Participants used a chin rest to
ensure consistent head positioning. A Dell desktop PC running
Windows 7 ran the experiments using E-prime 2.0 software
(Psychology Software Tools, Sharpsburg, PA, USA) to deliver
the stimuli and record button responses via a model 200a Serial
Response Box (Psychology Software Tools, Sharpsburg, PA,
USA).
Threshold Task
The threshold task began by introducing the participants with
two stimuli and telling them that they were required to indicate at
every trial which of the two are presented. After these instructions
were given, a single descending 1-up 1-down staircase procedure
was used to determine the maximum luminance contrast at
which each stimulus category could be reliably suppressed from
awareness using our masking procedure (for details regarding
the masking, see procedures for the recognition task in the
next section below). For each trial, participants were presented
with one of the two stimuli chosen at random by E-prime.
They had to verbally say which one they thought they saw and
guess if they were unsure. The experimenter then manually
entered their response by keypress. The target stimulus was first
set at 100% Michelson (1995) luminance contrast. Following
each correct categorization, the contrast decreased by 5%.
Following an incorrect response, a reversal would occur, meaning
the luminance contrast would increase by 5%. The task was
programmed to terminate following 12 reversals and the final
threshold was calculated as the average of the last eight switches
to account for greater potential errors due to uncertainty for the
first four.
Recognition Tasks
The recognition tasks were used to determine if participants were
able to perceive the stimuli at the contrast level determined in
the previous task. The luminance contrast for all stimuli was
set 5% below the threshold derived (i.e., 20% dropped to 15%)
in the threshold task to a minimum of 5%. The task began by
introducing participants the two stimuli and telling them that
they were required to indicate at every trial which of the two
are presented. Participants viewed a total of 64 individual trials,
which consisted of 32 invisible and 32 visible trials that were
presented in a random order. A break was provided midway.
The presentation sequences are depicted in Figures 1D,E. Each
trial began with the participant maintaining fixation on a blank
screen for 3000 ms. This was then followed by the presentation
of the stimulus between two visual masks. The timing of the
visual masks varied between the visible and invisible trails. At
the end of each trial, participants indicated by button pressing
which of the two possible stimuli they saw. Participants were
told to give their best guess in the event that they did not
see anything—as would be expected in the invisible condition.
Before moving to the priming task, a preliminary analysis was
conducted to verify that accuracy was within the confines of
chance (i.e., between 11 and 20 for 32 trials based on a binomial
distribution). Chance-level accuracy was taken as evidence that
the stimuli were appropriately suppressed and imperceptible
(Kingdom and Prins, 2016). If accuracy was outside the limits of
chance, luminance contrast was further adjusted (i.e., decreased
by an additional 5% if above chance, or increased by 5% if below
chance) and the recognition task was performed again before
moving on to the priming task.
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FIGURE 1 | The procedures. The panels display the different form (A), orientation (B) and size (C) stimuli that were used in the different experiments. Also shown are
the temporal sequence of events for both the recognition task during the invisible (D) and visible (E) conditions and the priming task during congruent (F) and
incongruent (G) trials when the prime was presented subliminally. In the visible condition for the priming task, the masks were presented differently, in a manner
similar to the visible condition in the recognition task (E). An auditory alerting cue was presented in the priming task at the end of the trial to help ensure that
participants responded to the target image as opposed to the prime.
Procedures for the Priming Task
This priming task was used to determine whether or not
feature-congruency had any influence on reaction times to a
target following a prime that was either visible or perceptually
invisible by means of masking. In total, there were 80 trials:
20 visible congruent trials, 20 visible incongruent trials,
20 invisible congruent trials and 20 invisible incongruent
trials. A break was provided midway. The presentation
sequences are depicted in Figures 1F,G. The sequence of
events was similar to those in the recognition task except
with the additional presentation of a visible target at the
end of each trial. The participant indicated with button
pressing which of two possible images the target corresponded
to as quickly and accurately as possible. The target was
accompanied by a 100 ms auditory alert cue to help ensure
participants were responding to this stimulus as opposed to the
prime.
Statistical Analyses
The data were analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social
Sciences (SPSS) version 23 (IBM Corporation; Armonk, NY,
USA), JASP software version 0.8 (University of Amsterdam,
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 4 April 2018 | Volume 12 | Article 13
Peel et al. Perceptual Discrimination and Visual Masking
Amsterdam, Netherlands), and GraphPad Prism version 6
(GraphPad Software Inc., La Jolla, CA, USA). Threshold values
were recorded during the procedures.
One-sample t tests against a test value of 16 (denoting chance)
determined if responses differed significantly from this value for
both visible and invisible conditions in the recognition tasks
before and after the priming task. For the priming task in
each of the three different experiments, the mean reaction time,
calculated from only the correct trials, acted as the dependent
variable in a two-way repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with Visibility (Invisible vs. Visible) and Congruency
(Congruent vs. Incongruent) as factors. Effect sizes (partial eta-
squared; η2p) obtained from the ANOVA are reported. Tukey’s
honest significant difference (HSD) pair-wise comparison tests,
which corrected for multiple comparisons, were carried out to
further examine interactions and effects deemed significant by
the ANOVA. In addition, Cohen’s d effect sizes for pair-wise
comparisons were calculated as the difference between the two
means divided by their pooled standard deviation (Cohen, 1988).
Unless specified otherwise, all reported p values were corrected
for multiple comparisons based on an alpha level of α = 0.05.
In addition to null hypothesis statistical testing (NHST),
Bayes factors were calculated. Within the framework of Bayesian
statistics, one quantifies the evidence in support for either the
null or the alternative hypothesis relative to the other (Wetzels
et al., 2011). This allows the possibility to draw inferences
about the viability of the null hypothesis, which traditional
NHST cannot do. For this study, we calculated Bayes factors
(BF01) denoting the likelihood of the null over the alternative
hypothesis for the contrasts between congruent and incongruent
trials for both the visible and invisible viewing conditions. A
BF01 value of 3 or more was considered to provide substantial
support for the null hypothesis (i.e., an absence of priming)
and values less than 0.33 to provide substantial support for the
alternative hypothesis (i.e., a presence of priming; Jarosz and
Wiley, 2014).
RESULTS
Thresholds for the Form, Orientation and
Size Experiments
For form, thresholds ranged between 5% and 40% luminance
contrast with a mean value of 20.12 (SD = 8.26). This was
qualitatively higher than for the other two categories with
orientation and size having lower values ofM = 7.05 (SD = 5.98,
range = 1.25–31.14) and M = 7.50 (SD = 4.80, range = 1.25–18),
respectively.
FORM EXPERIMENT
The masking technique used was successful in rendering stimuli
perceptually invisible—with categorization accuracy being at
chance-level when responding to the masked prime images in
both recognition tasks. However, a priming effect was observed
only when the primes were visible but not when the primes were
masked.
Recognition Tasks
Figure 2A displays the number of correct hits when participants
categorized visible and invisible stimuli before the priming
task took place. One-sample t-tests demonstrated that the
number of correct hits was greater than chance in the visible
(M = 31.68, SD = 0.81, t(33) = 113.40, p< 0.001) but not invisible
(M = 16.15, SD = 2.65, t(33) = 0.32, p = 0.749) conditions.
Likewise, the post-priming recognition task generated similar
results (Figure 2B). Again, one-sample t-tests demonstrated a
greater number of correct hits compared to chance in the visible
(M = 31.79, SD = 0.41, t(33) = 224.40, p < 0.001) but not in the
invisible (M = 16.15, SD = 2.18, t(33) = 0.39, p = 0.696) conditions.
Priming Task
Figure 3A displays the mean reaction times for the different
conditions for the form experiment. ANOVA revealed a main
effect of Visibility (F(1,33) = 16.68, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.34),
denoting slower reaction times in the visible compared to
invisible conditions, but not a main effect of Congruency
(F(1,33) = 1.82, p = 0.187, η2p = 0.05). In addition, there was a
significant Visibility × Congruency interaction (F(1,33) = 9.48,
p = 0.004, η2p = 0.22). Tukey’s HSD tests revealed that this
interaction was driven by a priming effect in the visible (p = 0.006,
d = 0.26) but not invisible (p = 0.891, d = 0.06) conditions.
Specifically, there were differences between congurent and
incongruent trials for the former but not the latter. Bayes
factors were also calculated for contrasts between congruent and
incongruent reaction times. A value of BF01 = 4.19 was found
for the invisible contrasts, providing substantial support for no
priming effects. In contrast, a value of BF01 = 0.52 was found for
the visible contrasts, which does not provide substantial support
for the alternative hypothesis. Accuracy results at the group level
were at ceiling levels of performance (M = 97.87%, SD = 3.48%,
range: 85% to 100%). Thus, accuracy was not compared between
conditions. Nonetheless, the presence of a possible speed-
accuracy trade-off effect was still assessed by averaging both
accuracy and reaction time scores across conditions for each
participant and then correlating them (Wickelgren, 1977). No
significant correlation was found (r(32) = 0.06, p = 0.749),
demonstrating a lack of a speed-accuracy trade-off. In summary,
priming ocurred in the visible but not invisible conditions.
ORIENTATION EXPERIMENT
The priming task in this experiment also demonstrated priming
in the visible but not invisible conditions. Although the
recognition task performed prior to the priming task revealed
that the stimuli were effectively suppressed from conscious
awareness, the same procedure performed after the priming
task suggests that the stimuli were no longer suppressed from
awareness as effectively.
Recognition Tasks
Figure 2C displays accuracy for the visible and invisible
conditions. Before the priming task, the number of correct hits
differed from chance in the visible (M = 31.12, SD = 2.07
t(33) = 42.57, p < 0.001) but not invisible (M = 17.00, SD = 3.14,
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FIGURE 2 | Results from the recognition tasks. Panels (A,B) display the mean ± SEM hits in the pre- and post-priming recognition tasks in the form experiment.
Similarly, panels (C,D) display the hits in the orientation experiment while panels (E,F) display the hits in the size experiment. Asterisks (∗) denote significant effects at
p < 0.05.
FIGURE 3 | Results from the priming tasks. The panels display the mean ± SEM reaction times in the priming task for both congruent (gray bars) and incongruent
(white bars) trials in the visible and invisible conditions for the Form (A), Orientation (B) and Size (C) experiments. Asterisks (∗) denote significant effects at p < 0.05.
t(33) = 1.89, p = 0.073) conditions. However, this was no longer
the case when the same recognition procedure was carried
out after the priming task. As demonstrated in Figure 2D,
one-sample t tests revealed that the number of correct hits
were greater than chance in both visibility conditions (Visible:
M = 31.38, SD = 1.34 t(31) = 65, p < 0.001; Invisible: M = 17.72,
SD = 2.24, t(31) = 3.59, p = 0.001). Two participants were unable to
provide recognition measures due to time constraints. Therefore,
data from only 32 participants were considered.
Priming Task
Figure 3B displays the mean reaction times for the different
conditions in the orientation experiment. ANOVA revealed
a main effect of Visibility, such that reaction times in the
visible condition were slower than the invisible condition
(F(1,33) = 47.23, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.58), as well as a main effect
of Congruency, such that reaction times in the incongruent
condition were slower than those in the congruent condition
(F(1,33) = 16.44, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.35). There was no interaction
between Visibility and Congruency (F(1,33) = 2.35, p = 0.135,
η2p = 0.08). The lack of an interaction is most likely a power
issue as opposed to the presence of a priming effect in both
the visible and invisible conditions. Performing paired sample
t-tests comparing congruent and incongruent conditions reveal
significant priming in the visible (t(33) = 2.4, p = 0.022) but
not invisible (t(33) = −1.1, p = 0.278) condition. Furthermore,
analysis of the data using a Bayesian approach corroborates
this interpretation. Specifically, there was substantial support for
priming in the visible condition (BF01 = 0.21) and substantial
support for no priming in the invisible condition (BF01 = 3.45).
Accuracy results were again at ceiling levels of performance
(M = 97.76%, SD = 4.97%, range: 60% to 100%). Therefore,
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this dependent variable was not analyzed except for determining
whether or not there was a speed-accuracy trade-off effect. No
significant correlation was found between reaction times and
accuracy (r(32) =−0.02, p = 0.900).
SIZE EXPERIMENT
The size stimuli were effectively masked. Recognition procedures
performed before and after the priming task demonstrated no
differences in the number of correct hits from chance in the
invisible viewing conditions. Similar to the priming tasks in the
form and orientation experiments, priming effects were observed
in the visible but not invisible conditions.
Recognition Tasks
Figure 2E displays the number of correct hits in the visible
and invisible conditions before the priming task. One-sample
t-tests revealed that the number of corrects hits were greater
than chance in the visible (M = 31.47, SD = 0.83, t(33) = 109.30,
p < 0.001) but not invisible (M = 15.68, SD = 1.67, t(33) = 1.13,
p = 0.265) conditions. The subsequent suppression check
conducted after the priming task confirmed that the perceptual
invisibility of the size stimuli was maintained. As displayed in
Figure 2F, one-sample t-tests demonstrated a greater number
of correct hits compared to chance in the visible (M = 31.59,
SD = 0.86, t(33) = 106.10, p< 0.001) but not invisible (M = 16.24,
SD = 2.83, t(33) = 0.49, p = 0.631) conditions.
Priming Task
Figure 3C displays the mean reaction times for the different
conditions in the size experiment. ANOVA revealed amain effect
of Visibility, whereby reaction times for the visible condition
were slower in comparison to the invisible one (F(1,33) = 34.80,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.51). There was also amain effect of Congruency,
whereby reaction times were faster in the congruent compared to
the incongruent conditions (F(1,33) = 5.08, p = 0.031, η2p = 0.13).
An interaction between Visibility and Congruency was also
found (F(1,33) = 16.62, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.34). Tukey HSD
tests demonstrated that this interaction effect was driven by
priming effects in the visible (p = 0.002, d = 0.53) but not
invisible (p = 0.553, d = 0.16) conditions. Using a Bayesian
approach, a value of BF01 = 1.64 was found for the invisible
contrast, and a value of BF01 = 0.02 was found for the visible
contrast. This provides substantial evidence in favor of priming
for the visible condition; however, the analysis is inconclusive
regarding the presence or absence of priming in the invisible
condition. Accuracy results were at ceiling levels of performance
again (M = 98.05%, SD = 3.66%, range: 80% to 100%) and
therefore were not analyzed except for the purposes of assessing
the presence of a speed-accuracy trade-off effect. No significant
correlation was found (r(32) = −0.34, p = 0.052) indicating the
absence of a speed-accuracy trade-off.
DISCUSSION
We hypothesized that priming effects would persist when
the primes were rendered perceptually invisible by means
of visual masking. This hypothesis was not supported.
Visual processing of subliminally presented primes did not
influence one’s ability to classify targets based on their shape,
orientation and size—even though priming effects were observed
in the visible condition. The presence of priming effects
during the visible condition demonstrates that the method
of presentation was effective for determining the presence of
priming effects. Thus, the lack of effects in the invisible condition
demonstrates that the prime was not processed in a way that
could influence the proceeding target. These findings have
implications for understanding the impact of subconscious
processing on perceptual discrimination.
The presence of priming effects in the visible but not
invisible condition could be explained by differences in top-down
modulation. Under ordinary circumstances without masking,
electrophysiological studies demonstrate that activation latencies
in higher-order areas in the prefrontal cortex coincides with or
even precedes ventral stream activation in perceptual recognition
tasks (Foxe and Simpson, 2002; Michel et al., 2004; Bar et al.,
2006). Results like these are often interpreted as reflecting
top-down modulation on ventral stream areas (Camprodon
et al., 2010). It is known that masking a stimulus interferes
with processing in these areas and subsequently diminishes the
effects of top-down modulation in such a way that eliminates
awareness of the stimulus (Fahrenfort et al., 2007). In the
present investigation, the subliminally presented primes did
not induce priming effects, which run contrary to models
that support feedforward projections (Riesenhuber and Poggio,
2000), and favor instead the importance of interactive feedback
and recurrent processing (Rao and Ballard, 1999).
On the other hand, we do not believe that differences
in priming effects between the visible vs. invisible conditions
could be explained by attention because differences in attention
between the two conditions were not possible. The order of
conditions was randomly generated and therefore there was no
way for the participant to know beforehand if a given condition
corresponded to the visible or invisible condition, which would
be required to allow them to direct attention differently. This
is an important consideration. Selective attention can influence
perceptual discrimination (Moore and Zirnsak, 2017). Although
neurons in the early stages of visual processing respond robustly
and predictably to basic low-level object features (Maunsell
and Treue, 2006), they are not solely governed by retinal
stimulation. Like neurons in many other brain regions, they too
are modulated by attention (Somers et al., 1999).
Form Experiment
We found no evidence of subliminal priming in the form
experiment. Previous experiments using CFS have shown that
the subliminal presentation of elongatedmanipulable tool objects
can influence the subsequent classification of visible ones as being
either a tool or an animal (Almeida et al., 2008; Sakuraba et al.,
2012). However, it was unclear from these studies as to whether
or not these effects were driven by the elongated shape of the
tools. A more recent CFS study by Hesselmann et al. (2016)
demonstrated that an objects’ shape, rather than it semantic
category, may have facilitated these effects. The authors failed to
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replicate these earlier findings in one experiment but they were
able to demonstrate in a separate experiment that the suppression
of elongated objects from awareness, irrespective of whether they
consisted of tools or animals, facilitated the participant’s ability
to subsequently classify visible target images as being either
elongated or not.
Despite regions in the dorsal visual pathway typically not
being associated with object recognition, some research suggests
that the unconscious computations mediated by areas in this
pathway may influence object categorization (Almeida et al.,
2008). This makes sense if one considers that the unconscious
processes carried out by the dorsal stream are more concerned
with configuring the hand to graspable objects, which tend to be
elongated in the real world, and lead to greater fMRI activation
in the superior parietal lobule compared to when non-graspable
objects are presented (Fang and He, 2005). The findings from the
present investigation are consistent with this previous research if
one considers that our stimuli across all three experiments were
not elongated. In agreement with this earlier work, we did not
observe priming for non-elongated stimuli.
However, a different study by Jimenez et al. (2017)
demonstrated that the presentation of subliminal square-like
and diamond-like stimuli, which are non-elongated shapes, can
facilitate their subsequent identification when presented as a
visible target. An important difference between their study and
ours is that their primes consisted of local elements arranged
as either a shape or an illusory contour. In contrast, our
study presented primes consisting of a continuous outline of a
shape. It is conceivable that the construction of illusory form is
likely to utilize different processing mechanisms (Marr, 1982).
Alternatively, differences between the studies could have arisen
due to differences in the familiarity of the stimuli. Jimenez et al.
(2017) used geometrical shapes that are well-known to people
while we used geometrical shapes that are less ubiquitous in the
environment.
Orientation Experiment
We also found no evidence of subliminal priming in the
orientation experiment. This lack of evidence does not agree
with previous demonstrations of masked orientation being
discriminable outside of awareness. For instance, Montoro et al.
(2014) found that masked global patterns oriented horizontally
or vertically primed the orientation of subsequent targets.
Participants were told that they would see target lines on the
screen and would have to categorize the lines orientation as
being either vertical or horizontal. The authors saw reliable
differences in reaction time between congruent and incongruent
prime-target combinations. Similarly, another study saw that the
gross direction of a masked arrow facilitated the subsequent
categorization of another arrow (Peremen and Lamy, 2014).
However, global compared to local processing is considered to
require higher-order processes (Schwarzkopf and Rees, 2011)
and thus may not be representative of orientation construction
in its most basic sense.
Perhaps the most convincing evidence of orientation
processing occurring outside of awareness comes from studies
by Soto et al. (2011) and King et al. (2016). The latter
repeated the same masking paradigm as the former during
magnetoencephalography (MEG). Both studies demonstrated
that the orientation of masked stimuli could still be maintained
and compared to a later stimulus at levels significantly above
chance. The latter also demonstrated that both visible and
invisible stimuli activated similar brain areas. However, it should
be noted that both studies used higher luminance contrast
values than we did in the present investigation. For example,
King et al. (2016) used three levels of luminance contrast on
all participants, which were 25%, 75% and 100%. Following
each trial, participants indicated on a 4-point Likert scale the
degree to which the stimulus was visible. From these data, the
authors examined behavioral priming and brain activation at
each of the different levels. Although the authors demonstrated
evidence of subliminal processing both behaviorally and with
brain imaging, it should be noted that the contrast values of the
trials were at least 25%, providing a stronger signal for the brain
to analyze than the stimuli used in the present investigation,
which had a mean luminance contrast of 7%. Thus, we applied
a more rigorous and conservative procedure to ensure that our
stimuli were perceptually invisible. Given the huge difference
in luminance contrast between our two studies it could be the
case that the Likert scale used by King et al. (2016) lacked the
sensitivity to determine which trials were truly subliminal.
Size Experiment
The size experiment demonstrated that awareness of the prime
was important to facilitate the subsequent perceptual size
discrimination of the target as evidenced by the presence
of priming in the visible but not invisible conditions. This
interpretation converges with findings from one of our
previous CFS studies (Laycock et al., 2017) and has important
implications. FMRI studies reveal that the lateral occipital
complex, which is presumably where the current shape stimuli
are first processed holistically, consists of two subdivisions—a
posterior subdivision that is sensitive to changes in size and
an anterior subdivision that is not (e.g., Larsson and Heeger,
2006). Perhaps it is the case that further processing in the more
anterior subdivision requires awareness. In addition, other fMRI
studies reveal how V1 responds to different sizes of stimuli
in a perceived as opposed to a retinotopic manner (Murray
et al., 2006; Sperandio et al., 2012; for a review see Sperandio
and Chouinard, 2015). These results have often been explained
as reflecting top-down modulation from higher-order visual
areas—although this has yet to be confirmed (Sperandio and
Chouinard, 2015). Based on the lack of priming in the present
investigation, it could be the case that awareness and additional
ventral stream processing might be necessary for this modulation
to occur.
Other masking studies demonstrated how differences in size
between the prime and target have little to no impact on how
participants respond to the target. For instance, Dehaene et al.
(2001) demonstrated that priming effects were similar during
a word classification irrespective of when the participants saw
masked primes that had similar or different font sizes than the
target words. Similarly, Chauncey et al. (2008) revealed how the
evoked-response potential (ERP) profiles in early visual areas
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were the same when participants were presented with different
font sizes of the same words during masking. Another study by
Eddy and Holcomb (2009) assessed the effect that image size
of common objects like cars and couches have on repetition
priming during masking. Again, the physical size of the images
demonstrated a degree of invariance across the early and later
stages of perceptual processing. However, participants in these
studies did not distinguish between stimuli on the basis of their
size. Rather, these studies sought to determine if priming effects
were to persist even with changes in size.
Limitations
Many of our interpretations rely on drawing inferences from
null effects in the invisible conditions. For this reason, it was
important for us to include visible conditions, which establishes
the presence of effects during awareness, and carry out two
statistical approaches (i.e., NHST and Bayesian statistics) to
determine the degree of convergence. A greater degree of
convergence between two statistical approaches yields greater
confidence in the findings, particularly when one (NHST) is
fundamentally not designed to verify the absence of effects. With
this in mind, we can be more confident about some results
than we can for others. Specifically, we can be more confident
about reporting the lack of priming in the invisible condition
during the Form and Orientation experiments than we can with
the Size experiment. Bayesian statistics demonstrated substantial
support for the null hypothesis in the invisible condition for
both the Form and Orientation experiments but not for the
Size experiments. One should always be cautious when making
inferences based on null effects, particularly when there is a lack
of convergence, such as was the case in the Size experiment.
Further investigation is required for confirmation.
Closing Remarks
This study investigated the extent to which basic low-level
object features might be processed outside of awareness for the
purposes of perceptual discrimination. It may seem paradoxical
that subliminal priming can occur for complex stimuli, as
evidenced elsewhere, but not for the simple stimuli used in the
present investigation. However, as discussed, these differences
may have important theoretical implications and should
be examined further. We demonstrate preliminary evidence
that subconscious processing does not facilitate subsequent
perceptual discrimination task for basic low-level object
features.
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